Foster, M. & Keane, M.
University College Dubin
The contrast-hypothesis of surprise (Teigen & Keren, 2003, Cognition) argues that cognitive responses of surprise occur when there is a high contrast between the surprising event and the default expected alternative. The integration hypothesis (Maguire, Maguire & Keane, 2011, JEP:LMC) has countered that surprise varies with the ease with which the surprising event can be integrated into a developing model of the discourse. Previous tests have shown the main difference between these two views is likely to lie in how they handle the impact of prior knowledge and different processing demands. Two experiments are reported that looks at one possible knowledge impact (whether the surprise scenarios, are within range of predictive schemas) and one type of processing demand (an intervening distractor task between comprehension of the scenario setting and the presentation of the surprise outcome). The results do not show any evidence that this processing demand impacts surprise, but both experiments show strong effects of prior knowledge. Specifically, we found that some surprising outcomes, were less surprising, than others if they fell within the "predictive range" of prior experience. The extent to which these two views can explain these results are discussed.