Topolinski, S.
University of Wuerzburg
The present embodied account of memory argues that fluency-based memory forms, namely both implicit memory and familiarity, are genuinely embodied in drawing on the efficiency of sensorimotor simulations related to the to-be-judged stimulus. These simulations are trained and run more fluently for old compared to new stimuli. In contrast, retrieval-based memory, namely recollection, is independent from stimulus-specific sensorimotor simulations because it draws on additional retrieval processes. In four experiments, words as verbal stimuli being mediated by the oral motor system were presented, some of them repeatedly, either under manual (e.g., moving a ball), or oral motor interference (e.g., chewing gum). In contrast to manual interference, oral interference prevented the acquisition of implicit memory (Experiment 1) and familiarity (Experiment 2), and substantially impaired the familiarity estimates in the remember-know paradigm (Experiment 3) and receiver-operating characteristics (Experiment 4), while leaving recollection unaffected (Experiments 1-4). This pattern establishes unconventional memory dissociations in healthy participants, e.g. explicit without implicit memory (Experiment 1), or recognizing without feeling familiar (Experiment 2), which are only known from severe clinical cases and have strong implications for our understanding of memory across disciplines.