Vigliocco, G.
UCL, U.K.
Within an embodiment framework, it has been argued that abstract concepts and words are learnt and represented as metaphorical extensions from our concrete knowledge. Thus, for example, exchanging ideas is seen as extension from exchanging objects and therefore is thought to be grounded on the same motor and perceptual processes. The alternative dominant view considers abstract concepts as not embodied, linked primarily to linguistic processes. Leaving open the possibility that such mechanisms play some role, we present a novel embodied view of abstract representation according to which our abstract knowledge would be grounded in our emotional states. In a nutshell, we argue that the distinction between concrete and abstract concepts is between concepts that are primarily grounded in our sensorimotor experience with the external world (concrete) and those also grounded in our inner emotional states (abstract). Such grounding in emotional states could have a key role in making abstract concepts learnable, given that these concepts are disadvantaged on a large number of other dimensions (such as e.g., familiarity, imageability, and age of acquisition, all of which favour concrete concepts and words). I will present results from series of studies that support this view. In particular, I will review recent work and present new results showing that: (a) abstract words tend to have statistically more affective associations than concrete words (not just for words directly referring to emotional states); (b) this difference in terms of affective associations has processing consequences such that, once all other factors are taken into account, subjects are faster in processing abstract words; (c) abstract word processing engages the neural system engaged in emotion processing and (d), emotionally valenced abstract words tend to be learnt earlier than more neutral abstract words, leading to the suggestion that the affective grounding might help especially at the initial stages of development.