Rodríguez-Gualda, I. & Moreno Ríos, S.
Facultad de Psicología. Universidad de Granada (Spain)
Does the probability of the events mentioned in conditionals influence the way the conditionals are represented? From the suppositional theory, the comprehension of a conditional depends on the perceived probability of occurrence of the consequent, given the antecedent. From the mental model theory, the comprehension of a conditional is based on the initial representation derived from it (not on the probability of the events). In the present study, the contents were constructed in order to create more probable or less probable situations based on the empirical experience. Thus, three kinds of content were used, depending on their frequency of occurrence in the world: very frequently, not very frequently or their occurrence is arbitrary in the world. Three tasks were used to evaluate how people understand semifactual (even-if) conditionals that connect two events (antecedent and consequent). Participants were tested with different measures: judgments about the probability of each event mentioned in the conditionals, the probability of the even-if statements and the degree of strength of a causal sentence. Results are shown and discussed from those theories.